• We are pleased to announce that the winner of our Feedback Prize Draw for the Winter 2024-25 session and winning £150 of gift vouchers is Zhao Liang Tay. Congratulations to Zhao Liang. If you fancy winning £150 worth of gift vouchers (from a major UK store) for the Summer 2025 exam sitting for just a few minutes of your time throughout the session, please see our website at https://www.acted.co.uk/further-info.html?pat=feedback#feedback-prize for more information on how you can make sure your name is included in the draw at the end of the session.
  • Please be advised that the SP1, SP5 and SP7 X1 deadline is the 14th July and not the 17th June as first stated. Please accept out apologies for any confusion caused.

IAI Oct 2006 Q19

  • Thread starter Srijana Raghunath
  • Start date
This was covered in my Actuarial Econs notes.

rivals produce fixed quantity: Cournot model
• firms chose best output for remainder of the market
• profit will be less than under a cartel, but more than under perfect competition
 
What would be the answer for the above question?
 
Hi Srijana, I believe the textbook 'Economics' 10th Ed, used currently for the IFoA's CB2 syllabus largely covers the Cournot model only as a duopoly, so I wouldn't really expect to see this question in the IFoA exams now. I'm not sure about the current Core Reading for the IAI exams.

However, if we ignore that the question is more general for a moment, and instead assume that the question assumes the market is a duopoly.

Building on what Calm has said, under the Cournot model, a firm assumes the other produces a certain quantity. This means that the demand curve for an individual firm has the same gradient as the industry demand curve.

(Drawing the demand curve on a graph, an individual firm's demand curve would be to the left of the industry demand curve by the quantity produced by the other firm).

So, here, given the demand curve, I would expect that if the individual firm increased the quantity it produced by 1, the price would fall by 2 ie option A.
 
Last edited:
Back
Top