Hi Lindsay,
I'm a little confused about what makes up the non-hedgeable risks part of the SCR when calculating the RM. The notes say that this is just reinsurance credit risk, insurance risk, op risk and residual market risk. However couldn't you hedge reinsurance credit risk by use of derivatives such as credit default swaps? Also, for mortality risk for example, couldn't you hedge this using standard reinsurance?
The notes also say that the RM is the theoretical amount in addition to the value of the BEL that an insurer would need to pay a third party in order for them to take responsibility for its liabilities. I'm not quite sure I see why this is the case.
Any help would be much appreciated!
Thanks,
Max
These are actually really good questions.
< couldn't you hedge reinsurance credit risk by use of derivatives such as credit default swaps? Also, for mortality risk for example, couldn't you hedge this using standard reinsurance? >
The answer to this question can be found at Article 77: Calculation of technical provisions in the Solvency II Directive (or equivalently, the Calculation of Technical Provisions part of the PRA Rulebook). This includes the following paragraph, included below for ease:
Article 77 of the SII Directive (paragraph 4 of my version

)
"Insurance and reinsurance undertakings shall value the best estimate and the risk margin separately. However, where future cash flows associated with insurance or reinsurance obligations can be replicated reliably using financial instruments for which a reliable market value is observable, the value of technical provisions associated with those future cash flows shall be determined on the basis of the market value of those financial instruments. In this case, separate calculations of the best estimate and the risk margin shall not be required."
The key sentence phrase that is worth highlighting is this one: " [the (re)insurance obligations] can be replicated reliably using financial instruments for which a reliable market value is observable".
(i) Credit default swaps could satisfy the 'observable market value' criteria; however 1) not all reinsurers will have a CDS that would pay out were it to default; and 2) even if there was a CDS it may be illiquid, which would violate the 'can be replicated reliably' criteria.
However, I don't in principle (subject to the above criteria being satisfied) see why a CDS couldn't be used to argue that the contribution of reinsurance counterparty risk to this element of the risk margin calculation wasn't required. I think that the entire reinsurance contract would need to structured as a financial instrument (as opposed to an insurance contract) to fall outside the scope of Article 77 but I'm happy to hear others' views on the matter.
(ii) Standard reinsurance would be transacted 'over the counter' and so would fail the '[observable] market value' criteria.
<The notes also say that the RM is the theoretical amount in addition to the value of the BEL that an insurer would need to pay a third party in order for them to take responsibility for its liabilities.>
Solvency II is a market consistent regime, i.e. it values assets and liabilities at a level that knowledgeable third parties would transact at arms' length.
The BEL is an amount that would be required to meet claims and expenses. If actual experience followed the assumptions (best estimate) reflected in the BEL there would be nothing for a third party to earn as profit. You can think of the risk margin as the amount that a third party would require to be incentivised (assuming they are rationale and are in the business of generating a return for its owners :-0) to take on the business.
Hope that helps; oh and apologies for not being Lindsay
